Foreknowledge Problem

[creekster]

I don't think that A necessarily follows B. God knowing how I will use my agency doesn't mean I'm not using it.

If God is truly omniscient you don't actually have agency. You only have the illusion of agency from your POV.

[wuapinmon]

I don't think that A necessarily follows B. God knowing how I will use my agency doesn't mean I'm not using it.

Would you say that you side with Maimonides about how to solve this problem? I think most Mormons would side with Maimonides.

See "Solution #3" on this link to clarify:

http://www.myjewishlearning.com/beli...Medieval.shtml

[mUUser]

Would you say that you side with Maimonides about how to solve this problem? I think most Mormons would side with Maimonides. See "Solution #3" on this link to clarify:

http://www.myjewishlearning.com/beli...Medieval.shtml

I've heard it explained like this, which makes some sense to me.

Imagine 3 chessmasters:
1. The first one is confident in winning because he is playing a machine he designed, programmed and built. He knows with certainty every move the machine will make, because he programmed the moves himself. There's no chance. He has perfect foreknowledge and the match is predestined.
2. The second chessmaster is confident in winning and is playing a computer too. While he didn't program the computer, he has a guidebook or manual with complete and exhaustive information about how the computer will play during the match. He has foreknowledge, but the match is not predestined.
3. The third chessmaster is confident in victory even though he's playing a real person instead of a computer. He cannot be completely certain how the opponent will play the game because the opponent has agency to choose for himself. The chessmaster has infinitly greater skill, knowledge and wisdom than his opponent, and can anticipate all the moves his opponent could make. This chessmaster has doesn't have perfect foreknowledge, but has tremendous foresight, and the match is not predestined.

I acknowledge the analogies are imperfect, but they're close enough for me. The first analogy is likened to a Calvinist view of foreknowledge because everything settled from the beginning. The second is supposedly close to an Arminian view because God has foreknowledge and everything is settled, but not predestined. However, I don't know enough about the Arminian believes to know if this is attributed accurately. The third is an open view in which God has neither perfect foreknowledge or has presettled anything, but is certain in victory because of his superior knowledge, creativity and wisdom. All three views are legitimate under the Christian umbrella IMO.

The third view strikes closest to home for me because its the model that most requires a really active, involved, responding God to our personal lives. It just strikes me as the most loving way to interact with His children.

Solution #3 in the link rattles my brain like Unity in Trinity and Trinity in Unity. Just can't get my head around it -- and maybe that's the point.

[NorthShoreCoug]

Not at all, just trying to get my hands around Wuap's comment.

1 Cor says he won't allow us to be tempted above that we are able to resist. If God knows what decisions we will make in a certain situations and we are trying to be good, then how come we end up in situations in which we end up sinning?

...

The fact that we DON'T resist a certain temptation doesn't necessarily mean that we are UNABLE to resist.

[All-American]

Would you say that you side with Maimonides about how to solve this problem? I think most Mormons would side with Maimonides.

See "Solution #3" on this link to clarify:

http://www.myjewishlearning.com/beli...Medieval.shtml

I don't disagree with what Maimonides says, but it doesn't quite explain how I see the issue. Maimonides attempts to solve the problem by casting God's knowledge as subject matter of a different kind than human freedom. I just don't see the problem in the first place. I think mUUser's example #3 comes closest to my understanding. God's foreknowledge of how we will use our agency doesn't mean we aren't exercising it.

[creekster]

The fact that we DON'T resist a certain temptation doesn't necessarily mean that we are UNABLE to resist.

Is it possible the statement that we will not be given temptations beyond which we can bear is actually more about our divine nature and potential than it is about any given deciison with which we are presented?

[thesaint258]

I think that part of the problem is that we often use our limited words and understanding to describe God. While doing this does help us gain some understanding and come closer to him, I think we tend to forget that He is a god. Whenever I talk about things like this with people, I'm always reminded of Isaiah 55:8 ("For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways. . . ."). I've had some experiences that confirm, to me at least, that He knows what will happen. Can I logically reconcile that with agency? No, but then, I'm not a god.

[RobinFinderson]

If God is truly omniscient you don't actually have agency. You only have the illusion of agency from your POV.

If God isn't truly omniscient, and reality he is just so aware of how the cosmos works that he offers his commandments as a kind of grandfatherly advice on how to avoid some of the pitfalls that bring about human suffering, then what gives him the right to judge us?

And what about prophets foretelling future events with great specificity?

The way God is set up for most Christian religions, including Mormonism, it seems like true omniscience must be part of the package.

[wuapinmon]

I've heard it explained like this, which makes some sense to me.

Imagine 3 chessmasters:
1. The first one is confident in winning because he is playing a machine he designed, programmed and built. He knows with certainty every move the machine will make, because he programmed the moves himself. There's no chance. He has perfect foreknowledge and the match is predestined.
2. The second chessmaster is confident in winning and is playing a computer too. While he didn't program the computer, he has a guidebook or manual with complete and exhaustive information about how the computer will play during the match. He has foreknowledge, but the match is not predestined.
3. The third chessmaster is confident in victory even though he's playing a real person instead of a computer. He cannot be completely certain how the opponent will play the game because the opponent has agency to choose for himself. The chessmaster has infinitly greater skill, knowledge and wisdom than his opponent, and can anticipate all the moves his opponent could make. This chessmaster has doesn't have perfect foreknowledge, but has tremendous foresight, and the match is not predestined.

I acknowledge the analogies are imperfect, but they're close enough for me. The first analogy is likened to a Calvinist view of foreknowledge because everything settled from the beginning. The second is supposedly close to an Arminian view because God has foreknowledge and everything is settled, but not predestined. However, I don't know enough about the Arminian believes to know if this is attributed accurately. The third is an open view in which God has neither perfect foreknowledge or has presettled anything, but is certain in victory because of his superior knowledge, creativity and wisdom. All three views are legitimate under the Christian umbrella IMO.

The third view strikes closest to home for me because its the model that most requires a really active, involved, responding God to our personal lives. It just strikes me as the most loving way to interact with His children.

Solution #3 in the link rattles my brain like Unity in Trinity and Trinity in Unity. Just can't get my head around it -- and maybe that's the point.

I like your choice #3. It is essentially what I believe. I reject Platonist definitions of God the Father.

The fact that we DON'T resist a certain temptation doesn't necessarily mean that we are UNABLE to resist.

No, but if God knows it all, then he knows we're going to sin, and therefore he knows that if we're tempted a certain way, that we will fall, therefore, why are we ever tempted in those moments when he knows we're going to sin. You can see the conundrum this creates.

I don't disagree with what Maimonides says, but it doesn't quite explain how I see the issue. Maimonides attempts to solve the problem by casting God's knowledge as subject matter of a different kind than human freedom. I just don't see the problem in the first place. I think mUUser's example #3 comes closest to my understanding. God's foreknowledge of how we will use our agency doesn't mean we aren't exercising it.

Well, the saint's post below sort of frames what I call the "typical Mormon" response to this issue. Maimonides wrote of this centuries ago, so it's not unique to Mormonism, by any means. If we view God as existing beyond our understanding (a totally Platonist notion, right?) then we have to view his knowledge as beyond description of, as you put, "of a different kind." Maimonides seems to be the most Mormon because it is basically just based on faith. All of my questioning is more of a philosophical entertainment exercise that fascinates me, but at the end of the day, it really all relies on faith, which is why I think what the saint says below is so appealing to most Mormons and, even, many Protestant and Catholic Christians. But, the issue is really there, if we hold that he is omniscient, then his foreknowledge creates a paradox (sort of) because of the problem of sin.

I think that part of the problem is that we often use our limited words and understanding to describe God. While doing this does help us gain some understanding and come closer to him, I think we tend to forget that He is a god. Whenever I talk about things like this with people, I'm always reminded of Isaiah 55:8 ("For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways. . . ."). I've had some experiences that confirm, to me at least, that He knows what will happen. Can I logically reconcile that with agency? No, but then, I'm not a god.

This is Maimonides assertion. I used to feel this way, and maybe I still do, but I think it makes more sense that God takes risks on us. I can't find the reference right now, but B.H. Roberts, I think, don't quote me on this, held that God knew all possibilities, but not which one we would choose, following Gersonides' view of the foreknowledge problem.

The way God is set up for most Christian religions, including Mormonism, it seems like true omniscience must be part of the package.

Thomas Aquinas held that God exists out of time, so we have our freedom, but he sees all things as happening at the same time. This is the easiest solution to the problem you've noted.

[thesaint258]

This is Maimonides assertion. I used to feel this way, and maybe I still do, but I think it makes more sense that God takes risks on us. I can't find the reference right now, but B.H. Roberts, I think, don't quote me on this, held that God knew all possibilities, but not which one we would choose, following Gersonides' view of the foreknowledge problem.

I think you're right about B.H. Roberts. I forget which book I read that in, but I think you're right. I think that without the faith component, the only way to reconcile the propositions that we have genuine agency and that God is omniscient is to redefine omniscience. I think that most religious people would reject the idea that everything is predetermined, so the only other option to resolve the incongruity is to redefine the other term.

[Sullyute]

Is it possible the statement that we will not be given temptations beyond which we can bear is actually more about our divine nature and potential than it is about any given deciison with which we are presented?

I agree with you here. I think that 1 Cor is simply stating that the "devil made me do it" is not a viable excuse for sin. That any situation we are put in we have the ability to resist. Or as you stated, as a son or daughter of God we have the divine ability to resist sin. The decision to resist is up to us.

I also like was Musser said that God has all knowledge of what is possible to know, but that doesn't necessarily mean he knows everything that will happen in the future.

PS. I just noticed that I am now a "senior member." I have only been here for 4 months and barely have a 100 posts and I am already a senior member?! That is a low threashold. You might want to think about raising that bar to keep riffraff like me out.

[wuapinmon]

Continuing the thread jack so that it is crystal clear that I am continuing the conversation with oxcoug and not trying to score any points in light of what happened yesterday....

"Limited God" does partially reply to the problem of theodicy. The problem here, however, is that Mormon theology and canon don't support a limited God argument. The Mormon conception of God includes routine intercession in matters great and small and the scriptures are full of past examples as well as anticipated events. Saying that he was powerless when something goes wrong introduces the "God of the lost keys" problem.

If you the say He can intercede in some cases but not others, and we just don't know the rules about when he can or cannot, then you have introduced a special pleading fallacy.

EDIT: I really want to find a different thread move this to...

Book 3 of Maimonides' (The Rambam) The Guide for the Perplexed is a good, but difficult, read about theodicy and omniscience. He basically says that all evil comes from men due to free will. Maimonides loved to say things in a peculiar manner...he wouldn't call god wise, so as not to ascribe qualities to him that he couldn't prove. Rather, he would say, "God is not foolish" or something along those lines.

[clackamascoug]

I've heard it explained like this, which makes some sense to me.

Imagine 3 chessmasters:
1. The first one is confident in winning because he is playing a machine he designed, programmed and built. He knows with certainty every move the machine will make, because he programmed the moves himself. There's no chance. He has perfect foreknowledge and the match is predestined.
2. The second chessmaster is confident in winning and is playing a computer too. While he didn't program the computer, he has a guidebook or manual with complete and exhaustive information about how the computer will play during the match. He has foreknowledge, but the match is not predestined.
3. The third chessmaster is confident in victory even though he's playing a real person instead of a computer. He cannot be completely certain how the opponent will play the game because the opponent has agency to choose for himself. The chessmaster has infinitly greater skill, knowledge and wisdom than his opponent, and can anticipate all the moves his opponent could make. This chessmaster has doesn't have perfect foreknowledge, but has tremendous foresight, and the match is not predestined.

I acknowledge the analogies are imperfect, but they're close enough for me. The first analogy is likened to a Calvinist view of foreknowledge because everything settled from the beginning. The second is supposedly close to an Arminian view because God has foreknowledge and everything is settled, but not predestined. However, I don't know enough about the Arminian believes to know if this is attributed accurately. The third is an open view in which God has neither perfect foreknowledge or has presettled anything, but is certain in victory because of his superior knowledge, creativity and wisdom. All three views are legitimate under the Christian umbrella IMO.

The third view strikes closest to home for me because its the model that most requires a really active, involved, responding God to our personal lives. It just strikes me as the most loving way to interact with His children.

Solution #3 in the link rattles my brain like Unity in Trinity and Trinity in Unity. Just can't get my head around it -- and maybe that's the point.

Or, there could be a 4th solution.

For every possible choice of a chess move made, a new dimension is opened up, and every possible move is ultimately played out, and the two chess players have ultimate chess nirvana, where they know everything about every choice because they lived out the consequences of their actions. When they die, all of the dimensions are condensed into a singular experience, and the person has a perfect knowledge of the ramifications of their actions.

Today in another dimension, 20 little kids are having fun, and will grow up and have families of their own.