Judicial Nomiation and Confirmations

[All-American]

Reid just pushed the red button.

http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/...11881413579404

The number of votes required to proceed with a confirmation is now 51, dropped from 60.

[Joe Public]

Wow.

[Eddie]

Gutsy move.

I mean - unless I read things incorrectly it sure looks like enough people are pissed off at the democrats right now that there are all kinds of prognosticators talking about the republicans making major gains in the next election - some predicting a republican majority.

This could turn into a case of getting what you want and then getting burned with it if the tables turn a year from now.

[Clark Addison]

It would be a lot easier for me to vote against the Democrats if I didn't have to vote for the Republicans. And vice versa.

(Summon Uncle Ted)

[clackamascoug]

The US Government has become the equivalent of Gordian's Knot. Perhaps we need a Alexander.

[Uncle Ted]

(Summon Uncle Ted)

Please use the Uncle Ted approved version...

Ted Nugent Summons.jpg

[Uncle Ted]

"The American people believe Congress is broken. The American people believe the Senate is broken…It's time to change the Senate before this institution becomes obsolete," Mr. Reid said.

I thought Obama already obsoleted the broken senate by just appointing them without senate approval...

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/us...pointment.html

“I refuse to take ‘no’ for an answer,” Mr. Obama said

Edit: Not to mention by just calling them "Czars"...

[pellegrino]

I'm not sure I understand what he meant by the part in bold, especially the word obsolete.

"The American people believe Congress is broken. The American people believe the Senate is broken…It's time to change the Senate before this institution becomes obsolete,"

[Katy Lied]

The mechanics of voting produce different outcomes. If the majority required is unanimity (100% approval needed to change), then a body becomes extremely stable, probably moribound and unable to flexibly deal with new challenges. If the majority required is 51%, then the group becomes extremely unstable, because cross alliances can occur at the drop of a hat. In a 100-member senate in gridlock at 50-50, only one person needs to be induced to change her vote to change the outcome. But then, the other side can induce just one person to change again, and we're back to gridlock.

It turns out that 2/3 approval turns out to be a very good outcome, stable enough to prevent frenzied changes in the body, but flexible enough to deal with changing circumstance.

The seminal work in the mechanics of vote majorities was done by Buchanan & Tullock in their book The Calculus of Consent. Depending upon supermajority requirements, you can go through a list of governments and predict which ones are self-stable and which ones are unstable (like New Zealand used to be, with its 51% requirement).

Barbera & Jackson claim that if the requirement to change the rules is a simple majority, but the requirement to make policy is a supermajority (as it is in this case), the situation is inherently unstable. Sooner or later the bare majority ruling party will change the rules to require a simple majority to make policy. This is what Reid did. Here is their article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics: http://pareto.uab.es/sbarbera/SB-MJ%...0Quarterly.pdf

The senate won't quickly end up in a crazed march to destruction a la the California legislature circa 1990s. This rule change is only for some senate confirmations. And the senate itself isn't the only decision making body in the Fed. But Barbera & Jackson would probably predict that this rule change will slowly be shoved through for many other decisions.

I'm probably boring everyone out there, but this is game theory stuff.

[Color Me Badd Fan]

The mechanics of voting produce different outcomes. If the majority required is unanimity (100% approval needed to change), then a body becomes extremely stable, probably moribound and unable to flexibly deal with new challenges. If the majority required is 51%, then the group becomes extremely unstable, because cross alliances can occur at the drop of a hat. In a 100-member senate in gridlock at 50-50, only one person needs to be induced to change her vote to change the outcome. But then, the other side can induce just one person to change again, and we're back to gridlock.

It turns out that 2/3 approval turns out to be a very good outcome, stable enough to prevent frenzied changes in the body, but flexible enough to deal with changing circumstance.

The seminal work in the mechanics of vote majorities was done by Buchanan & Tullock in their book The Calculus of Consent. Depending upon supermajority requirements, you can go through a list of governments and predict which ones are self-stable and which ones are unstable (like New Zealand used to be, with its 51% requirement).

Barbera & Jackson claim that if the requirement to change the rules is a simple majority, but the requirement to make policy is a supermajority (as it is in this case), the situation is inherently unstable. Sooner or later the bare majority ruling party will change the rules to require a simple majority to make policy. This is what Reid did. Here is their article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics: http://pareto.uab.es/sbarbera/SB-MJ%...0Quarterly.pdf

The senate won't quickly end up in a crazed march to destruction a la the California legislature circa 1990s. This rule change is only for some senate confirmations. And the senate itself isn't the only decision making body in the Fed. But Barbera & Jackson would probably predict that this rule change will slowly be shoved through for many other decisions.

I'm probably boring everyone out there, but this is game theory stuff.

Nope, not boring me. The Democrats opened Pandora's box. The Republicans don't have a history of blocking a Democrat's nominee to the Supreme Court. The Democrats do. So, the next time the GOP has a majority in the Senate and has the White House -- which they had something like five of Bush's eight years and I think for half of Reagan's term -- they'll amend on Reid's stunt and put whoever they want on the Supreme Court.

An overall pretty dumb way to get the narrative off of Obamacare.

[byu71]

LOL. I mean I have to to keep from getting upset. Someone like Harry Reid with all this power. Look what he and Nanci when teamed up with power brought us.

Well, what are you going to do. The dems sidekicks the media aren't going to be apalled. Those that claim it will haunt the dems when the repubs get the Senate don't understand the power of having the conventional media on your side.

I am talking about the same media that did such a great job of warning us about what was coming with Obamaca, excuse me I mean the Affordable Care Act.

[imanihonjin]

The mechanics of voting produce different outcomes. If the majority required is unanimity (100% approval needed to change), then a body becomes extremely stable, probably moribound and unable to flexibly deal with new challenges. If the majority required is 51%, then the group becomes extremely unstable, because cross alliances can occur at the drop of a hat. In a 100-member senate in gridlock at 50-50, only one person needs to be induced to change her vote to change the outcome. But then, the other side can induce just one person to change again, and we're back to gridlock.

It turns out that 2/3 approval turns out to be a very good outcome, stable enough to prevent frenzied changes in the body, but flexible enough to deal with changing circumstance.

The seminal work in the mechanics of vote majorities was done by Buchanan & Tullock in their book The Calculus of Consent. Depending upon supermajority requirements, you can go through a list of governments and predict which ones are self-stable and which ones are unstable (like New Zealand used to be, with its 51% requirement).

Barbera & Jackson claim that if the requirement to change the rules is a simple majority, but the requirement to make policy is a supermajority (as it is in this case), the situation is inherently unstable. Sooner or later the bare majority ruling party will change the rules to require a simple majority to make policy. This is what Reid did. Here is their article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics: http://pareto.uab.es/sbarbera/SB-MJ%...0Quarterly.pdf

The senate won't quickly end up in a crazed march to destruction a la the California legislature circa 1990s. This rule change is only for some senate confirmations. And the senate itself isn't the only decision making body in the Fed. But Barbera & Jackson would probably predict that this rule change will slowly be shoved through for many other decisions.

I'm probably boring everyone out there, but this is game theory stuff.

Buchanan & Tullock and The Calculus of Consent, I had no idea that someone else even new that book existed let alone had actually read it. Gordon Tullock is a very nice man and used to be extremely engaging (is he still alive?) Although, my impression was that in his later years he hung around in the game a bit too long and became kind of a rambler.

[UVACoug]

The mechanics of voting produce different outcomes. If the majority required is unanimity (100% approval needed to change), then a body becomes extremely stable, probably moribound and unable to flexibly deal with new challenges. If the majority required is 51%, then the group becomes extremely unstable, because cross alliances can occur at the drop of a hat. In a 100-member senate in gridlock at 50-50, only one person needs to be induced to change her vote to change the outcome. But then, the other side can induce just one person to change again, and we're back to gridlock.

It turns out that 2/3 approval turns out to be a very good outcome, stable enough to prevent frenzied changes in the body, but flexible enough to deal with changing circumstance.

The seminal work in the mechanics of vote majorities was done by Buchanan & Tullock in their book The Calculus of Consent. Depending upon supermajority requirements, you can go through a list of governments and predict which ones are self-stable and which ones are unstable (like New Zealand used to be, with its 51% requirement).

Barbera & Jackson claim that if the requirement to change the rules is a simple majority, but the requirement to make policy is a supermajority (as it is in this case), the situation is inherently unstable. Sooner or later the bare majority ruling party will change the rules to require a simple majority to make policy. This is what Reid did. Here is their article in the Quarterly Journal of Economics: http://pareto.uab.es/sbarbera/SB-MJ%...0Quarterly.pdf

The senate won't quickly end up in a crazed march to destruction a la the California legislature circa 1990s. This rule change is only for some senate confirmations. And the senate itself isn't the only decision making body in the Fed. But Barbera & Jackson would probably predict that this rule change will slowly be shoved through for many other decisions.

I'm probably boring everyone out there, but this is game theory stuff.

Interesting. Thanks

[UVACoug]

This is calculated move by Democrats. They know it may increase their chances of losing the Senate, but I'm guessing they only made the move after coming to the conclusion that their chances of retaining the majority were not that great. By pulling the trigger now, they can easily fill all the current vacancies with liberal judges and may cause other liberal judges currently on the bench now to retire or take senior status to open up more spots. This move puts the judiciary in liberal hands for decades. That is a benefit they are willing to risk the Senate for. Republicans will have the same opportunity when they get power back (and have a Republican President), but the number of vacancies will be a lot smaller then.

[Uncle Ted]

This is calculated move by Democrats. They know it may increase their chances of losing the Senate, but I'm guessing they only made the move after coming to the conclusion that their chances of retaining the majority were not that great. By pulling the trigger now, they can easily fill all the current vacancies with liberal judges and may cause other liberal judges currently on the bench now to retire or take senior status to open up more spots. This move puts the judiciary in liberal hands for decades. That is a benefit they are willing to risk the Senate for. Republicans will have the same opportunity when they get power back (and have a Republican President), but the number of vacancies will be a lot smaller then.

Bingo.