For the benefit of BlueHair and anyone else interested, here is what Judge Walker said about the idea of legislating purely from a moral and ethical (as opposed to rational) basis:
In the absence of a rational basis, what remains of
proponents’ case is an inference, amply supported by evidence in
the record, that Proposition 8 was premised on the belief that
same-sex couples simply are not as good as opposite-sex couples.
FF 78-80. Whether that belief is based on moral disapproval of
homosexuality, animus towards gays and lesbians or simply a belief
that a relationship between a man and a woman is inherently better
than a relationship between two men or two women, this belief is
not a proper basis on which to legislate. See Romer, 517 US at
633; Moreno, 413 US at 534; Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429, 433
(1984) (“[T]he Constitution cannot control [private biases] but
neither can it tolerate them.”).
The evidence shows that Proposition 8 was a hard-fought
campaign and that the majority of California voters supported the
initiative. See Background to Proposition 8 above, FF 17-18, 79-
80. The arguments surrounding Proposition 8 raise a question
similar to that addressed in Lawrence, when the Court asked whether
a majority of citizens could use the power of the state to enforce
“profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral
principles” through the criminal code. 539 US at 571. The
question here is whether California voters can enforce those same
principles through regulation of marriage licenses. They cannot.
California’s obligation is to treat its citizens equally, not to
“mandate [its] own moral code.” Id (citing Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa v Casey, 505 US 833, 850, (1992)). “[M]oral
disapproval, without any other asserted state interest,” has never
been a rational basis for legislation. Lawrence, 539 US at 582
(O'Connor, J, concurring). Tradition alone cannot support
legislation. See Williams, 399 US at 239; Romer, 517 US at 635;
Lawrence, 539 US at 579.
proponents’ case is an inference, amply supported by evidence in
the record, that Proposition 8 was premised on the belief that
same-sex couples simply are not as good as opposite-sex couples.
FF 78-80. Whether that belief is based on moral disapproval of
homosexuality, animus towards gays and lesbians or simply a belief
that a relationship between a man and a woman is inherently better
than a relationship between two men or two women, this belief is
not a proper basis on which to legislate. See Romer, 517 US at
633; Moreno, 413 US at 534; Palmore v Sidoti, 466 US 429, 433
(1984) (“[T]he Constitution cannot control [private biases] but
neither can it tolerate them.”).
The evidence shows that Proposition 8 was a hard-fought
campaign and that the majority of California voters supported the
initiative. See Background to Proposition 8 above, FF 17-18, 79-
80. The arguments surrounding Proposition 8 raise a question
similar to that addressed in Lawrence, when the Court asked whether
a majority of citizens could use the power of the state to enforce
“profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral
principles” through the criminal code. 539 US at 571. The
question here is whether California voters can enforce those same
principles through regulation of marriage licenses. They cannot.
California’s obligation is to treat its citizens equally, not to
“mandate [its] own moral code.” Id (citing Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa v Casey, 505 US 833, 850, (1992)). “[M]oral
disapproval, without any other asserted state interest,” has never
been a rational basis for legislation. Lawrence, 539 US at 582
(O'Connor, J, concurring). Tradition alone cannot support
legislation. See Williams, 399 US at 239; Romer, 517 US at 635;
Lawrence, 539 US at 579.
Comment